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“He who may intrude upon another at will is the master of the other and, in
1
fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant.”

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. The Case of Brian Pietrylo
In 2006, Brian Pietrylo was a server at a Houston’s restaurant
operated by Hillstone Restaurant Group in Hackensack, New
2
Jersey. While working at Houston’s, Pietrylo created a MySpace
3
group called the “Spec-Tator.” In his initial posting, Pietrylo
explained that Spec-Tator’s purpose was to “vent about any BS we
deal with out [sic] work without any outside eyes spying in on us.
This group is entirely private, and can only be joined by invitation.”
4
He then proclaimed, “[L]et the s**t talking begin.”
Pietrylo invited past and current employees to join the group,
5
including Karen St. Jean, a greeter, and Doreen Marino, a server.
Group members posted sexual remarks about Houston’s
management and customers, jokes about customer service and
quality specifications, and references to violence and illegal drug
6
use. TiJean Rodriguez, a Houston’s manager, had St. Jean to his
home for dinner, and during the evening, St. Jean logged into her
7
MySpace account and showed him the posts on Spec-Tator, which
8
Rodriguez subsequently reported to upper management. St. Jean
9
provided upper management with her username and password,
1. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974 (1964).
2. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
3. Id.
4. Id. at *1–2.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *3–4.
7. Id. at *2.
8. Id. at *2–3.
9. Id. St. Jean claims that even though upper management did not threaten
her, she provided them access to her account only because she thought she “would
have gotten in some sort of trouble.” Id. at *3.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/7

2

Pabarcus: Are "Private" Spaces on Social Networking Websites Truly Private?

2011]

ARE PRIVATE SPACES TRULY PRIVATE?

399

and after reading the posts, the regional supervisor fired Pietrylo
and Marino because their posts were “offensive” and violated
Houston’s four core values: professionalism, positive mental
10
Pietrylo and
attitude, aim-to-please approach, and teamwork.
Marino filed a lawsuit claiming, inter alia, invasion of privacy
11
because Hillstone intruded upon their seclusion.
B. The Development of Privacy and the Restatement (Second) of Torts
Section 652B Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The common law torts of invasion of privacy and intrusion
upon seclusion emerged from the advancement of technology.
The advent of instantaneous photography and the invading
presence of the newspapers into private affairs led Samuel Warren
and Louis Brandeis to write their seminal article The Right to Privacy
12
in 1890. The basic right they sought to protect was the right to be
13
Seventy years later, William Prosser synthesized the
let alone.
common law right to privacy into four distinct torts: (1) intrusion
upon seclusion; (2) appropriation; (3) publication of private facts;
14
and (4) false light publicity. The American Law Institute adopted
Prosser’s classification of the right to privacy in the Restatement
15
(Second) of Torts sections 652A–E (1977), and the vast majority
of jurisdictions have specifically recognized section 652B, intrusion
16
upon seclusion.
Section 652B provides, “One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive
17
to a reasonable person.” Kuhn v. Account Control Technology breaks
the tort into three elements: “(1) an intentional intrusion (physical
or otherwise); (2) on the solitude or seclusion of another; (3) that
18
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Traditionally,
10. Id. at *4.
11. Id. at *4–5, *18–19.
12. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890).
13. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 12–13, 162 (2008).
14. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–E (1977).
16. Id. § 652B apps. (listing “court citations to Restatement, Second”). Fortytwo states plus the District of Columbia have cited section 652B since 1977. See id.
17. Id. § 652B.
18. 865 F. Supp. 1443, 1448 (D. Nev. 1994) (quoting PETA v. Bobby Berosini,
Ltd., 867 P.2d 1121, 1131 (Nev. 1994)).
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intrusion upon seclusion has guarded against an intrusion of one’s
home or other physical area that protects an individual’s personal
19
The emergence of
matters, such as a hospital or hotel room.
online social networking, however, raises the issue of whether a
private virtual space can be incorporated into the common law’s
protection against intrusion.
This article begins by presenting the emergence of social
networking websites and the appropriate approach to analyze
20
actions on the Internet. Next, this article argues that a private
21
This
virtual space can satisfy the elements of section 652B.
analysis examines the comments to the Restatement, the case law,
and the underlying public policy for the elements of intrusion
upon seclusion provided by the Kuhn framework by (1) examining
22
what constitutes an intrusion; (2) determining whether a virtual
space can be “private” so as to establish an expectation of
23
seclusion; and (3) evaluating the proper standard by which to
judge what is highly offensive to a reasonable person within the
24
context of social networking websites.
II. SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES AND PROBLEMS OF PERSPECTIVE
When approaching legal issues that involve the Internet,
practitioners and scholars look for analogies between cyberspace
25
and real space. To make meaningful analogies in the intrusion
upon seclusion analysis, the nature of social networking websites
must first be understood. This section first explores the emergence
of social networking websites to provide background on the privacy
interests at stake; second, it provides an analytical structure for how
to approach issues involving the Internet—whether the approach
should be from the viewpoint of the Internet as a virtual reality or
whether it should focus on how the Internet technically functions.

19. See SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 161–62 (referencing William Blackstone and
the law’s treatment of the home as one’s castle); Prosser, supra note 14, at 389–90
(explaining that an intrusion upon one’s home, a hospital room where a woman is
giving birth, or a person’s hotel room all constitute “intrusion”).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 361
(2003).
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A. The Emergence of Social Networking Websites
Social networking websites have grown exponentially in the
last five years, with the two largest sites being Facebook and
26
MySpace. At the time of this writing, Facebook hosts more than
750 million active users worldwide, who collectively spend more
than 700 billion minutes on Facebook each month and individually
27
create, on average, 90 pieces of content each month. MySpace,
while losing ground to Facebook, is still the second largest social
28
networking website with 63 million users. Currently, to create a
Facebook or MySpace account, a person needs a valid e-mail
address and must certify that he or she is at least thirteen years
29
The person is then prompted to fill out a profile, which
old.
30
contains about forty pieces of personal information. In Facebook,
people can network with others by asking them to be their “friend.”
Once the person confirms the friendship request, they each have
access to the other’s profile information based on the privacy
31
settings each has in place. In addition, Facebook users can form
26. See, e.g., Clint Boulton, Facebook Passed Google, Yahoo, Microsoft in User
Engagement, EWEEK.COM (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Web-ServicesWeb-20-and-SOA/Facebook-Passed-Google-Yahoo-Microsoft-in-User-Engagement384309/ (“Facebook bested Web giants Google, Yahoo and Microsoft in time
spent online in the United States through 2010, with users spending 12.7 percent
of their time at the social network Website.”); Sampad Swain, Statistics: Facebook
Bypasses MySpace and Twitter Stronger than Ever, SAMPAD’S BLOG (Feb. 10, 2009),
http://sampadswain.com/2009/02/statistics-facebook-bypasses-myspace-andtwitter-stronger-than-ever/. Since 2009, LinkedIn and Twitter have become the
third and fourth largest social networking websites, with 26.6 million visitors and
23.6 million visitors, respectively. Boulton, supra.
27. Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
28. Desire Athow, 10 Million Users Leave MySpace Within a Month,
ITPROPORTAL (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.itproportal.com/2011/03/27/10million-users-leave-myspace-within-month/. In 2007, MySpace had 185 million
registered users with 4.5 million people on the site at any one time. Scott Elkin,
MySpace Statistics, SCOTTELKIN (May 12, 2007), http://scottelkin.com
/programming/aspnet-20/myspace-statistics/. However, Facebook has come to
dominate the social networking landscape, as MySpace lost 10 million users
between January and February 2011 alone. Athow, supra.
29. Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/Help/Privacy (last
visited Sept. 13, 2011); Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://
www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook
Terms].
30. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1149 (2009).
31. Privacy Settings, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php#!
/settings/?tab=privacy (last visited Sept. 2, 2011) (permitting users to set their
desired privacy level for different types of information, including the ability to
“customize” certain information, which allows the exclusion of specific
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groups with other “friends” where members of the group can share
32
messages, pictures, and videos.
The ubiquitous use of the Internet and the posting of personal
information have created a “privacy paradox”: users of social
networking websites tend to disclose a high degree of personal
33
The
information online, yet retain an expectation of privacy.
strongest sense of intrusion is when people not understood to be
part of a network gain access to the user’s information and
34
pictures. To control access, both Facebook and MySpace permit
users to set their desired privacy settings. For example, users can
control access to their profiles and allow only their approved
friends to see their full profiles, while everyone else sees only a shell
35
Similar
consisting of the person’s name and profile picture.
settings can also be applied to groups. In Facebook, a group’s
privacy setting can be: “secret,” where only members can see the
group, who is in it, and what is posted; “closed,” where anyone can
see the group and who is in it, but only members can see the
posted material; or “open,” where anyone with a Facebook account
can view the group, who is in it, and the content posted in the
36
group. The issue of whether intrusion upon seclusion applies to
social networking websites arises when a group designated “secret”
or “closed” is accessed by a person who is not authorized. This is
information from particular people).
32. To create a group, a user logs in and from the home page clicks on
“Create Group.”
33. Avner Levin & Patricia Sánchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1004 (2009) (“[U]sers of social networking websites
tend to disclose much personal information online, yet they seem to retain an
expectation of privacy.”).
34. Id. at 1025–26. Results from a survey of 2,500 respondents revealed that
sixty-seven percent of respondents were more upset about family versus
acquaintances seeing their pictures, and fifty-four percent believe that it is wrong
for people to access information that is not intended for them. Id.; see also
Grimmelmann, supra note 30, at 1167 (“[For c]lose friends, it is always OK to
comment on their profiles. . . . With distant acquaintances, it is almost never OK.
It’s those in the middle that are tricky . . . .”); Michelle Slatalla, ‘Omg My Mom
Joined Facebook!!’, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2007, at G1, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2007/06/07/fashion/07Cyber.html (recounting the horror of the
journalist’s teenage daughter when she found out that her mom joined Facebook
and began “friending” her friends) (the term “omg” is shorthand for “Oh, my
God,” used commonly in text messaging or instant messenger).
35. Sharing and Finding You on Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com
/about/privacy/your-info-on-fb (last Nov. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook Privacy
Policy] (select “expand all”).
36. Id. When logged into Facebook, click on “Groups” in the left margin,
then “Create Group,” which will prompt the creator to set the desired privacy
settings.
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the case of Pietrylo, who created the MySpace equivalent of a
“secret” or “closed” group.
B. Problems of Perspective
A preliminary issue courts must resolve before reaching the
merits of a case involving the Internet is to determine, as Orin Kerr
37
Should the case be examined
puts it, the “facts” of the case.
through physical reality or virtual reality? Kerr labels the viewpoint
of virtual reality as the “internal perspective” and the viewpoint of
38
In the internal
physical reality as the “external perspective.”
perspective, the facts follow the virtual perspective of the user; in
the external perspective, the facts follow the behind-the-scenes
39
Perspective is
perspective of how the Internet actually works.
important because the facts of the case differ drastically depending
40
on the approach and can determine the outcome of a case.
Applying the internal and external perspectives to intrusion
upon seclusion and social networking websites produces two
different sets of facts. From the internal perspective, a social
networking website is an actual place where users can gather to
share ideas, pictures, and videos and interact with others. From the
external perspective, social networking websites are nothing more
than computer codes, wires, and hard drives. For example, if a
user of a social networking website sends a message to a friend, the
user is instructing her computer to send a message to her Internet
Service Provider (ISP), which directs the ISP to forward the
41
message to the friend’s ISP. Which set of facts is most appropriate
to examine issues of intrusion upon seclusion?
To select the more appropriate perspective, Kerr suggests
studying applicable law for clues of an internal or external
approach, and if that fails, to adopt the perspective of the party that
42
the law seeks to regulate. The first approach examines statutes,
43
This approach provides little
legislative intent, and case law.
insight to intrusion upon seclusion. Because the tort is defined by
37. Kerr, supra note 25, at 357.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 363.
40. Id. at 364–79 (illustrating the different outcomes as a result of perspective
in cases of the Fourth Amendment, Internet governance, computer crime, and
copyright).
41. Id. at 366 (going through the steps of sending an e-mail message).
42. Id. at 389.
43. Id. at 391–96.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7

404

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

common law, there are no statutes to examine or legislative intent
44
to consult. Similarly, case law does not reveal an intent to adopt
one perspective over the other because intrusion upon seclusion
has not been applied in a meaningful way to the Internet or social
45
networking websites. Therefore, the second approach will apply
to intrusion upon seclusion involving social networking websites.
The second approach is following the perspective of the
person the law seeks to regulate. Although Kerr is cautious about
the second approach, he justifies it on the basis that laws are
46
designed to influence the behavior of targeted individuals. When
the law regulates offline conduct, the external perspective applies,
and when the law regulates online conduct, the internal
47
perspective applies.
Kerr illustrates the online/offline distinction by presenting two
cases concerning the Fourth Amendment that are useful to
intrusion upon seclusion. The first case is United States v.
48
Charbonneau, in which the court adopted the internal perspective.
In Charbonneau, an undercover FBI agent entered a chat room
49
posing as a pedophile. The defendant was a member of this chat
room and sent an e-mail to everyone with an attachment
50
containing child pornography. The court analogized the e-mail
to postal mail and held that because the FBI agent was “in” the chat
51
room, the defendant had no expectation of privacy. While the
court did not label its approach as the internal perspective, the
court treated the chat room as a physical room, adopting the
perspective of the police officer—the person the law seeks to
regulate.
The second case is Bohach v. City of Reno, in which the court
52
adopted the external perspective. Bohach involves a case where
police officers used the Department’s “Alphapage” system to send
53
messages to each other that appeared on visual display pagers.
The officers were aware that the system automatically recorded and
44. See supra Part I.B (describing the development of intrusion upon
seclusion).
45. See infra Part III.B (discussing case law interpretations of intrusion).
46. Kerr, supra note 25, at 396.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 398.
49. United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1185; see also Kerr, supra note 25, at 398 (discussing the reasoning of
the court in Charbonneau).
52. Kerr, supra note 25, at 399–400.
53. Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (D. Nev. 1996).
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stored the messages on a central computer “because that’s how the
54
Focusing on the offline conduct, the court
system work[ed].”
55
held that there was no search under the Fourth Amendment.
The cases Kerr presents under the Fourth Amendment
demonstrate the online/offline distinction that can apply to
intrusion upon seclusion cases involving social networking websites.
When a defendant intrudes upon a plaintiff’s online seclusion
using the social network’s website (e.g., Facebook, MySpace,
LinkedIn, or Twitter), then the defendant’s conduct is online and
the internal perspective applies. When a defendant intrudes upon
a plaintiff’s online seclusion without logging onto the social
network’s website or using a computer at all, then the defendant’s
conduct is offline and the external perspective applies. In the
Pietyrlo case, upper management accessed the private group by
logging onto MySpace, using St. Jean’s login and password, and
56
Upper
viewing the comments made within the private group.
management did not go through the ISP company to retain
57
The internal perspective
electronic copies of posted material.
would thus apply. For the purposes of this article, only the
defendant’s online conduct within a social networking website will
be examined, so only the internal perspective applies in this
intrusion upon seclusion analysis.
III. INTENTIONAL INTRUSION (PHYSICAL OR OTHERWISE)
The analogies between cyberspace and real space in intrusion
upon seclusion focus on virtual rooms and areas and real-world
rooms and areas. In making some of these analogies, a few scholars
have argued that common law privacy and intrusion upon seclusion
58
are unable to effectively deal with social networking technologies.
However, these scholars have not fully examined the extent to
which privacy can be created on social networking websites, looking
59
only at information available in the public domain. To fill this
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1235.
56. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *3 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
57. Id. at *5.
58. Neil Richards & Daniel Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1918–19 (2010) (arguing that issues involving protection from
the media and the extensive collection, use, and dissemination of personal
information by businesses has become more problematic with the use of social
networking technologies).
59. Id. at 1919 (citing Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482–
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gap, this section will analyze what constitutes an intrusion and how
the law should include virtual spaces as being capable of being
intruded upon by examining the Restatement’s definition, case law,
and public policy.
A. Rule for What Constitutes an Intrusion
The first element of intrusion upon seclusion is an intentional
intrusion, physical or otherwise, perpetrated by the defendant
60
against the plaintiff. There are three general situations that the
Restatement identifies as an intrusion. First, it may be a physical
intrusion, such as defendants forcing their way into a hotel room or
61
insisting on entering one’s home. Second, an intrusion can occur
through the “use of the defendant’s senses, with or without the
help of [technology], to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private
affairs,” such as peering through an upstairs window with
62
binoculars or tapping telephone lines. Finally, an intrusion can
occur through an investigation or examination of the plaintiff’s
private concerns, such as “opening his private and personal mail,
searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank account
[information],” or compelling an inspection of his personal
63
An intrusion of a
documents through a forged court order.
virtual space does not fit under the first category of a physical
intrusion, so it must find support from the case law in either the
second or third categories.
B. Case Law Interpreting the Definition of Intrusion
Case law recognizes the role technology can play as a vehicle
for an intrusion. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit analyzed privacy
associated with a personal website from a statutory perspective in
64
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., but noted the difficulty in doing
83 (D. Me. 1987) (“Much of the compilation of data [that businesses collect]
occurs from information that is in the public domain, and courts have concluded
that collecting such data is not an invasion into a person’s ‘solitude’ or
‘seclusion.’” (emphasis added))).
60. Kuhn v. Account Control Tech., 865 F. Supp. 1443, 1448–49 (D. Nev.
1994); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977).
62. Id.
63. Id.
Such intrusions would also violate the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
United States v.
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (quoting United States v.
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (Armed Forces 1996)).
64. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). The
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so because the statutes were enacted prior to the everyday use of
65
the Internet. Nevertheless, the similarities to the Pietrylo case and
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning are instructive on how to treat private
groups on social networking websites.
Like Pietrylo, Konop created a personal webpage, controlled
access to the content of his page by issuing account names and
passwords to coworkers that e-mailed him for access, posted critical
comments about his employer, his superiors gained access to it by
using the account name and password of an approved member,
66
and Konop was fired as a result of his posts. In its analysis, the
Ninth Circuit found “no principled distinction between the
employer’s eavesdropping . . . and Hawaiian’s access of Konop’s
67
secure website.” The eavesdropping comparison would put the
act of accessing a private group on a social networking website in
the Restatement’s second category of intrusion, when private
information in a private space is surreptitiously overseen or
overheard.
When technology is used to penetrate a private space or
matter, an intrusion has occurred. The Restatement specifically
identifies the use of binoculars to look through an upstairs window
68
or a wiretap on a telephone as intrusions upon seclusion. The
courts have broadened section 652B’s reach to also include the use
69
70
of television cameras and microphones as means capable of
intrusion. The common element is that technology provides access
to otherwise private information or spaces. The trajectory of the
plaintiff brought claims under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the
Stored Communications Act, and the Railway Labor Act. Id.
65. Id. at 874 (“[T]he difficulty is compounded by the fact that the ECPA was
written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web.”).
66. Id. at 872–73.
67. Id. at 884.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977); see also Ali v.
Douglas Cable Commc’ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that
unannounced recordings of personal telephone calls at work constituted an
intrusion).
69. See Huskey v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding
that an NBC camera man intruded upon a prisoner’s seclusion by videotaping him
without his consent); Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999)
(holding that ABC intruded by surreptitiously videotaping conversations with
coworkers); Y.G. & L.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990) (holding a news crew violated a couple’s privacy by showing footage of them
at a hospital event after they actively tried to avoid the cameras).
70. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998) (holding that a
flight nurse who wore a microphone so that a television producer could record the
statements made by a car accident victim while being transported to the hospital
constituted an intrusion).
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common law is broadening the Restatement to include
technologies that make an intrusion possible. The Ninth Circuit’s
comparison of accessing a private website to eavesdropping and the
common law’s expansive approach suggests that the element of
intentional intrusion of section 652B is satisfied by the infiltration
of a private group on a social networking website.
Moreover, unauthorized access into a private virtual space is or
should be an intrusion to remain consistent with the virtual space’s
physical counterparts. The Restatement identifies that opening
personal mail or examining private bank account information can
71
result in an intrusion. Likewise, opening other people’s e-mail or
viewing their banking information online is as intrusive as if the
same information were accessed in paper form. Because the act of
eavesdropping on a private in-person conversation constitutes an
intrusion, the same result should extend to online conversations
held in a private virtual space.
Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases also suggest that
a private profile or group on a social networking website deserves
privacy protection. The test for whether a space is private under
the Fourth Amendment is whether there is an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
72
reasonable. The Supreme Court ruled that anything exposed to
73
the public does not constitute a search. Examples include a pen
register used by the phone company to determine what phone
74
numbers have been dialed from a private home and aerial

71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977).
72. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Afsheen John
Radsan, The Case for Stewart over Harlan on 24/7 Physical Surveillance, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1475, 1480–90 (2010) (surveying the Supreme Court’s decisions on surveillance
and assessing the federal circuit courts of appeals’ adherence to Justice Harlan’s
two-pronged test).
73. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
74. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). The Court focused on the
facts that all telephone users know that they must convey their phone numbers to
the phone company, that phone companies make permanent records of the
numbers dialed for monthly billing, and pen registers are used to check billing
operations, detect fraud, and prevent illegal activity. Id. The approach the Court
used in this case would be Kerr’s external perspective of looking at how
technology actually works. Kerr, supra note 25, at 357. While the external
approach does not apply to the type of actions analyzed in this article, it does
illustrate how the external approach will often result in the destruction of privacy
because information is conveyed to third parties, such as Facebook administrators,
who reserve the right to remove any posts or materials that violate its terms of use.
Facebook Terms, supra note 29.
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75

surveillance of private homes. Applying this reasoning to profiles
or groups on social networking websites that are left open by users
likewise results in no privacy protection. Facebook explicitly states,
“[w]hen you publish content or information using the Public
setting, it means that you are allowing everyone, including people
off of Facebook, to access and use that information, and to
76
associate it with you (i.e., your name and profile picture).” The
public exposure of an open profile or group on a social networking
website precludes any privacy protection.
When steps are taken to retain privacy, however, the Supreme
Court protects the space. Simply by walking inside a telephone
booth and pulling the door shut behind him, Katz established a
sufficient privacy expectation to be protected by the Fourth
77
Amendment. Fourth Amendment privacy protection also applies
when an electronic beeper in a container of chemicals is brought
inside a house and reveals information (the location and
movement of the chemicals inside the house) that could not have
78
been obtained without a warrant and to infrared radiation
emanating from the home that was detected using technology not
79
available to the general public. When social network users create
a private profile or group, it is as if they are closing the virtual door
behind them. Everyone, including people off of Facebook, can no
longer see their profile or groups. Any unauthorized monitoring
or viewing of the private virtual space would constitute an
intrusion. The case law interpreting statute, common law, and the
Fourth Amendment all indicate that a private virtual space created
on a social networking website constitutes a space that can be
intruded upon.
C. Public Policy Reasons for Extending Intrusion to Virtual Spaces
The harm associated with intrusion is surveillance. Daniel
Solove describes “surveillance” as an awareness that one is being
80
watched. As a result, surveillance can lead to anxiety, discomfort,
75. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
76. Facebook Terms, supra note 29.
77. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
78. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711 (1984).
79. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion,
the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant.”).
80. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 106–12.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7

410

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

81

self-censorship, and inhibition. Intrusion protects the individual
by creating liability for such unwanted social invasions, which
Solove links to what Warren and Brandeis termed “the right to be
82
let alone.”
The concept of surveillance appears to be a concern for users
of social networking websites. In a survey of 2,500 respondents,
almost twenty-four percent were concerned or very concerned with
the possibility that their parents could view their profiles, almost
thirty-five percent of users were concerned or very concerned that
their employer could access their profile, and forty-three percent
83
were worried about strangers. A commonsense response to such
concerns is that if people are truly concerned about such
information getting out, they simply should not post it on social
networking websites, or they should apply the appropriate privacy
settings that match their desired protection. However, this is not a
satisfying answer. If someone wishes to share information with a
certain group and takes measures to create seclusion from others,
that space should be recognized as private by the law.
Solove argues that to adequately address the problems of
privacy on the Internet, the law should enforce an individual’s
84
social expectations of confidentiality. Such expectations should
be enforced even if the surveillance is covert and the victim is never
aware of the actual intrusion, because the harms have a chilling
85
effect on behavior and speech. The chilling effect applies equally
to positive messages and negative messages because surveillance
affects all forms of speech on the Internet through intrusion.
While people should be held accountable for what they say and do
on social networking websites, such monitoring should not come at
the expense of otherwise legitimate speech. As a matter of public
policy, when a person creates and maintains a private group within
a virtual space on a social networking website, the common law and
section 652B should recognize unauthorized access as an intrusion
to protect against surveillance and its associated harms.
81. Id. at 108; see also Grimmelmann, supra note 30, at 1166 (applying
Professor Solove’s paradigm to surveillance on Facebook).
82. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 162.
83. Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1025–26.
84. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 191 (2007); see also Samantha L. Millier, Note, The
Facebook Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J.
541, 549–50 (2009) (discussing Professor Solove’s view of privacy on the Internet
and his solutions to privacy concerns).
85. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 109.
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IV. SOLITUDE OR SECLUSION
The previous section established that virtual spaces can be
intruded upon, and the next issue is whether a plaintiff can
demonstrate adequate seclusion while on social networking
websites. This section argues that plaintiffs can establish adequate
seclusion to support a claim of intrusion upon seclusion. To do so,
this section first provides the Restatement’s definition of seclusion
and applies it to social networking websites; second, it analyzes the
nature of seclusion within a group and then on the Internet; and
finally, it examines public policy issues related to “Facebook
stalking.”
A. Rule for What Constitutes Seclusion
The Restatement provides that for defendants to be subject to
liability, they must have intruded into “a private place” or “a private
86
seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.”
However, there is no liability for examining things that are already
public or part of a public record, and there is no liability for
87
observing or taking someone’s photograph while in public.
Nevertheless, some matters may still be considered private when in
the public sphere, such as the plaintiff’s underwear or lack
88
thereof.
Extrapolating from the premises above suggests that profiles
and groups on social networking websites without any privacy
settings—leaving them “open” to anyone who clicks on them—do
not establish seclusion because the users have not attempted to
89
conceal their persons or affairs. Moreover, posting information
on the Internet without taking any steps to make it private is
analogous to going out in public. The Restatement makes clear
that seclusion does not attach to actions and communications
90
performed in public, and therefore a claim for invasion of privacy
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Facebook Terms, supra note 29 (Facebook administrators explicitly state,
“When you publish content or information using the Public setting, it means that
you are allowing everyone, including people off of Facebook, to access and use
that information, and to associate it with you (i.e., your name and profile
picture).”); Facebook Privacy Policy, supra note 35 and accompanying text
(explaining that online social network users can select their desired level of
privacy).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
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would probably fail for open profiles or groups on social
networking websites.
There are two issues that follow for private groups. The first
issue is whether the presence of multiple people within a private
group precludes an individual within the group from claiming
seclusion. The second issue is whether the nature of the Internet
refutes any claims of seclusion even if an individual can maintain
seclusion while in a group.
B. Case Law Interpreting the Definition of Seclusion
1.

Seclusion Within a Group

Normally when people enter the public sphere, they do not
have an expectation of privacy because they have stepped outside
their zone of seclusion, but it is not a complete loss of seclusion. In
91
Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co., a television crew was working
92
on a story about the Illinois prison system. A cameraman shot
footage of a prisoner exercising in the jailhouse gym with his shirt
off, but the inmate was concerned about others outside of the jail
93
seeing his tattoos. Even though the prison guards and anyone
else who walked by could see him, the court reasoned that “the
mere fact a person can be seen by others does not mean that
94
person cannot legally be ‘secluded.’” The courts have extended
this principle to protect a couple attending a private event at a
95
hospital that was covered by a television news crew, a car accident
victim’s conversation while in a helicopter transporting her to the
96
hospital, a couple filmed in the dining room of a private
97
restaurant, and employees’ conversations filmed at a private
“telepsychic” business by an investigative reporter wearing a hidden
91. Huskey v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
92. Id. at 1285.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1287–88.
95. Y.G. & L.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 502 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that a couple attending an event at the hospital for in vitro
couples only chose to disclose their participation to other in vitro couples and that
“they did not waive the right to keep their condition and the process of in vitro
private, in respect to the general public”).
96. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 492–94 (Cal. 1998)
(holding that a helicopter nurse who wore a microphone for television producers
intruded upon the victim’s seclusion because the course of receiving emergency
treatment “carries a traditional and legally well-established expectation of
privacy”).
97. Stessman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685 (Iowa 1987).
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98

camera.
The principle that the presence of others does not necessarily
destroy the protection of seclusion also governs the workplace
99
environment. In United States v. McIntyre, a city’s police chief
100
Although
ordered two officers to bug the assistant chief’s office.
the assistant chief’s door was open and a secretary worked fifteen
feet away at the time the assistant chief made the recorded
statements, the court ruled, “[a] business office need not be sealed
101
to offer its occupant a reasonable degree of privacy.” Not only is
aural privacy within the workplace protected, but also visual
102
privacy. In Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Services, Inc., the organizers of a
fashion show set up a curtained dressing area for the models at the
convention center, but did not realize that a security video camera
103
When security guards used the
could see into the area.
surveillance camera to watch and videotape the models changing
clothes, the court found the actions intruded upon the seclusion of
104
the models.
Not all surreptitious video and audio recordings in the
workplace, however, intrude upon an employee’s seclusion. In
Marrs v. Marriott Corp., an employer videotaped an employee while
105
he was picking a locked drawer of a desk in an open office area.
Kemp v. Block is a case in which an employee recorded a heated
argument with his supervisor in an area where coworkers could
106
In both cases the courts ruled that the
overhear them.
defendants did not intrude upon the plaintiffs’ seclusion because
the plaintiffs had no privacy vis-à-vis the coworkers who shared that
107
The seclusion-within-a-group line of cases provides that
space.
seclusion can be established within a defined group of people when
98. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 69 (Cal. 1999) (“[E]mployees
may enjoy a limited, but legitimate, expectation that their conversations and other
interactions will not be secretly videotaped by undercover television reporters,
even though those conversations may not have been completely private from the
participants’ coworkers.”).
99. 582 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1978).
100. Id. at 1223.
101. Id. at 1224.
102. 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991).
103. Id. at 1424.
104. Id. at 1427.
105. 830 F. Supp. 274 (D. Md. 1992).
106. 607 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Nev. 1985). Even though the court uses the Fourth
Amendment analysis of a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable, the decision illustrates that there is no privacy
expectation in this situation because seclusion cannot be established. Id. at 1264.
107. Marrs, 830 F. Supp. at 283–84; Kemp, 607 F. Supp. at 1264.
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steps are taken to keep information within that group and an
alleged intruder is outside that group.
Applying this framework to the Spec-Tator group that Pietrylo
created on MySpace suggests that Pietrylo created seclusion
108
Pietrylo
because privacy was “thrown about his . . . affairs.”
created a secluded virtual space when he activated the privacy
109
The only way to gain access to
settings on the MySpace group.
110
Furthermore, MySpace and other
the group was by invitation.
social networking websites require an account name and
111
password, which helps assure that a person cannot sign in as
another person without authorization. Finally, Pietrylo stated that
his intention of creating the group was to provide a forum to talk
openly about what occurred at work without management hearing
112
of it. These facts support a finding that Pietrylo created a private,
virtual space because the group was only available to a limited
number of people and it was not part of a larger common area.
Moreover, the seclusion of the virtual space was not destroyed
by the presence of the other group members being able to read the
113
posts.
Using the seclusion-within-a-group line of analysis,
Pietrylo’s expectation of privacy applies only to those outside the
group, just as the expectation of privacy in a jailhouse gym or at a
hospital social event applies only to a television-viewing audience.
Because the Hillstone Restaurant management was explicitly not
114
part of Pietrylo’s group, he maintained his seclusion from those
individuals.

108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977); see supra notes 2–4
and accompanying text.
109. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Sept. 14,
2011); LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/home?trk=hb_home (last visited Sept.
14, 2011); MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2011) (click
the login link at the top to access the site); TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com/ (last
visited Sept. 14, 2011).
112. Pietrylo, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *1–2.
113. See supra notes 91–107 and accompanying text (discussing cases where
seclusion was established despite being in a group setting or in the presence of
others).
114. Pietrylo, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *2.
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a. Meaningful Distinction Between Simultaneous
Dissemination and Secondhand Repetition
It could be argued that the seclusion-within-a-group analysis
does not apply because Hillstone was invited into the Spec-Tator
group when St. Jean provided upper management with her
115
Even if St. Jean provided
MySpace account name and password.
upper management with her account information free from
coercion, the Sanders court would still find an intrusion into
Pietrylo and Marino’s seclusion. The Sanders court reasoned:
While one who imparts private information risks the
betrayal of his confidence by the other party, a substantial
distinction has been recognized between the secondhand
repetition of the contents of a conversation and its
simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced second
auditor, whether that auditor be a person or a mechanical
device. Such secret monitoring denies the speaker an
important aspect of privacy of communication—the right
to control the nature and extent of the firsthand
116
dissemination of his statements.
Even though the posts on the Spec-Tator group remained
accessible to the group members for an extended period of time, as
opposed to a television camera capturing a moment in time,
Hillstone entered an on-going private conversation under the
pretext of being an actual participant in that conversation, much
117
like the telepsychic investigative reporter posing as a coworker.
But is the Sanders court’s distinction between simultaneous
dissemination and secondhand repetition meaningful? Is there
something worth protecting with simultaneous dissemination that
is not destroyed by secondhand repetition? If St. Jean had told
upper management exactly what was posted on the Spec-Tator
group without giving them access to the site itself, there would be
no intrusion, the same information would have been disclosed, and
Pietrylo and Marino would still have been fired. For the distinction
between simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition to
be meaningful in intrusion upon seclusion claims, the distinction
must serve the ultimate goal of protecting the space, regardless of
the information that was discovered, because the tort is complete as
soon as the intrusion is made. If the essence of Pietrylo’s case were
115. Id. at *2–3.
116. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Ribas v.
Clark, 696 P.2d 637, 640–41 (Cal. 1985)).
117. Id. at 70.
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the publication of the posts to those outside the Spec-Tator group,
then his intrusion upon seclusion claim should not be allowed to
go forward because the invasion would not be the harm. While it is
not the goal of this article to provide a full and complete answer to
this issue, a closer examination of the distinction between
simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition can
provide a more complete picture of what constitutes seclusion and
the values intended to be protected.
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis on the
privacy interests protected during searches rejects the distinction
between simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition.
In United States v. White, the defendant and a government
informant, Harvey Jackson, engaged in illegal narcotic
118
A series of four conversations took place at
transactions.
Jackson’s home, during which an agent hid in the kitchen closet
with Jackson’s consent, overhearing the conversations, and a
second agent outside Jackson’s home listened using a radio
119
The Court ruled that
receiver from the wire that Jackson wore.
120
the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
reasoning that for constitutional purposes,
no different result is required if the agent instead of
immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations
with defendant, either (1) simultaneously records them
with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his
person . . . (2) or carries radio equipment which
simultaneously transmits the conversations either to
recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents
121
monitoring the transmitting frequency.
The Supreme Court’s analysis found no legitimate privacy interests
in the right to control firsthand dissemination as the Sanders court
did.
The White decision appears to put the Fourth Amendment at
odds with the distinction the Sanders court made between
simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition in
intrusion upon seclusion claims. Moreover, the defendant’s liberty
interest associated with the Fourth Amendment is greater than a
plaintiff’s privacy interest in controlling firsthand dissemination,
yet the liberty interest loses and the privacy interest prevails. These
118.
119.
120.
121.

United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746 (1971).
Id. at 747.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 751.
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conflicting outcomes can nevertheless be reconciled upon a closer
examination of the values associated with each.
The overriding value in the Supreme Court’s decision in White
appears to be ensuring the proper functionality of the criminal
justice system. The Court made a value judgment: there is no
privacy interest in interpersonal, face-to-face interactions when
122
The Court reasoned, “[i]nescapably, one
committing a crime.
contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his
123
If the Court were
companions may be reporting to the police.”
to provide a privacy right under the Fourth Amendment to protect
the right to control the nature and extent of the firsthand
dissemination of one’s statements, then it would be creating an
opportunity for criminal behavior to continue.
The Court
recognized this possibility and explained, “[n]or should we be too
ready to erect constitutional barriers to relevant and probative
124
The Court
evidence which is also accurate and reliable.”
identified the benefits of allowing an electronic recording into
evidence, which included a more reliable rendition of what
occurred, making it less likely an informant will change his mind to
testify, less of a chance that threat or injury will suppress
unfavorable evidence during trial, and less likely that cross125
All of these values
examination will confound the testimony.
enhance the functionality of the criminal justice system, which
126
As a result, the
appeared to be the Court’s primary concern.
distinction between simultaneous dissemination and secondhand
repetition was properly rejected because the balance between a
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and the State’s interest in
preventing and punishing crime would have been improper.
The distinction between simultaneous dissemination and
122. Other Fourth Amendment rights still apply. If the officer hiding in
Jackson’s kitchen closet had not first received consent from Jackson, it would have
been an illegal entry into Jackson’s home without a warrant. Likewise, if the police
had placed a listening device in Jackson’s kitchen without consent from Jackson or
a warrant, that too would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
123. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
124. Id. at 753.
125. Id.
126. Id. The Court stated:
Considerations like these [benefits to the criminal justice system]
obviously do not favor the defendant, but we are not prepared to hold
that a defendant who has no constitutional right to exclude the
informer’s unaided testimony nevertheless has a Fourth Amendment
privilege against a more accurate version of the events in question.
Id.
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secondhand repetition is properly enforced, however, in a claim for
intrusion upon seclusion because the values in this tort shift to
protecting the privacy of the space created. What is important in
intrusion upon seclusion is maintaining the integrity of an area that
people have sought to make private so that actions and
communications that are intended to be private remain so. A value
protected by maintaining the integrity of seclusion includes what
127
She argues that “privacy
Julie Inness identifies as intimacy.
cannot be captured if we focus exclusively on either information,
access, or intimate decisions because privacy involves all three
areas” and suggests that “these apparently disparate areas are
linked by the common denominator of intimacy—privacy’s content
128
Inness states
covers intimate information, access, and decisions.”
that “intimacy” draws its meaning from one’s “love, liking, or care.
Intimate decisions concern such matter and, thus, involve a choice
on the agent’s part about how to (or not to) embody her love,
129
In light of her ideas about intimacy, Inness
liking, or care.”
developed a conception of privacy, under which privacy “now
amounts to the state of the agent having control over decisions
concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from the
agent’s love, caring, or liking. These decisions cover choices on the
agent’s part about access to herself, the dissemination of
130
As such, “the
information about herself, and her actions.”
131
construction of intimacy lies on the agent’s shoulders.”
Inness’s construction of privacy aligns with intrusion upon
seclusion. The Restatement (Second) of Torts requires that the
132
Likewise,
plaintiff “throw[]” privacy about his person or affairs.
the construction of intimacy is on the agent’s shoulders, meaning it
is the agent—or plaintiff—who has the burden to make a space
private. Pietrylo did this by making the Spec-Tator a private group.
133
While
Pietrylo also shared intimate communications and ideas.
his comments about his place of employment and employer are not
intimate in the physical or sexual sense, Pietrylo’s comments do

127. JULIE INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992); see also SOLOVE,
supra note 13, at 34–37 (surveying similar theories of intimacy).
128. INNES, supra note 127.
129. Id. at 75.
130. Id. at 91.
131. Id.
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
133. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *3–4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
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draw on his caring and liking, or lack thereof, for his workplace.
Finally, Pietrylo attempted to control access and dissemination of
135
All of
information about himself by making the group private.
the elements of Inness’s conception of privacy are met by Pietrylo’s
actions.
The value that is protected through the distinction between
simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition is intimacy
and maintaining space for intimacy to occur. While secondhand
repetition is always a concern, such repetition does not threaten
the space where intimacy can occur. Rather, it forces people to
evaluate with whom they wish to share intimate information.
Simultaneous dissemination, however, threatens the space itself.
Inness incorporates access to oneself and the dissemination of
136
information about oneself into her conception of privacy, which
the Sanders court echoes by protecting the right to control the
nature and extent of the firsthand dissemination of one’s
137
statements. Therefore, because intrusion upon seclusion involves
intimacy where criminal behavior does not, the distinction between
simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition is properly
recognized in intrusion upon seclusion to protect the integrity of
the space.
b.

MySpace Page Not Similar to an Open Office Space

It could instead be argued that the virtual space associated
with the MySpace page created an area of common space shared by
multiple coworkers, similar to the open office space found in
138
139
However, this argument fails because the SpecMarrs or Block.
Tator group (i.e., the virtual space) was only weakly associated with
the workplace. There is no evidence that the MySpace group was
accessed at the restaurant because Pietrylo and Marino were servers
140
The employees presumably had little
and St. Jean was a greeter.
to no access to computers with Internet access during their shifts.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *2.
136. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
138. Marrs v. Marriott Corp., 830 F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Md. 1992) (videotaping
an employee picking a locked desk in a common area).
139. Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (D. Nev. 1985) (overhearing a
heated argument while at work).
140. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *2–3 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008) (discussing how the employees at the
restaurant gained access to the website).
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Moreover, Pietrylo’s stated intention was to air criticism outside the
presence of management, which could not be done freely at the
restaurant because a supervisor or manager would always be on
141
The fact that Pietrylo dissociated the Spec-Tator group
duty.
from the restaurant is significant because upper management is
removed from the space.
c.

Seclusion Need Not Be Absolute

Even if the MySpace page were considered to be part of the
workplace, the private website would be more akin to McIntyre and
B.P.S. Guard Services than Marrs and Kemp. McIntyre and B.P.S.
Guard Services established that aural and visual privacy within the
142
The precautions
workplace does not need to be absolute.
Pietrylo took to make the Spec-Tator group private made it more
143
comparable to a personal office in a police station or an office
144
145
section protected by curtains, rather than an open office area
146
or a shared common area. Therefore, Pietrylo could probably
establish that his private group on MySpace met the seclusion
requirement for a claim of intrusion upon seclusion.
d.

Apparent Authority

Hillstone may argue that there was apparent authority to enter
the Spec-Tator group when St. Jean provided her username and
password, but the Fourth Amendment’s rule on apparent authority
can be applied to intrusion upon seclusion to reject such an
argument. When a space is owned and controlled by more than
one person so that they share common authority, any of those
147
people can give consent to government agents to search the area.
The Court has held that common authority rests
on mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is
reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has
the right to permit the inspection in his own right and
141. Id. at *1–2.
142. Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir. 1991);
United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1978); see supra text
accompanying notes 99–107.
143. McIntyre, 582 F.2d at 1224.
144. B.P.S., 945 F.2d at 1424.
145. Marrs v. Marriott Corp., 830 F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Md. 1992).
146. Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1263 (D. Nev. 1985).
147. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974).
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that the others have assumed the risk that one of their
148
number might permit the common area to be searched.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court expanded common authority to
those who have apparent authority to give consent to a search
based on whether the facts and circumstances would give a person
of reasonable caution the belief that the person has authority over
149
the area.
In the case of Pietrylo, assuming St. Jean gave her username
and password free from any coercion, Hillstone may be able to
claim that it received consent from St. Jean through apparent
authority. In Rodriguez, the fact that the third party had a key to the
apartment was a significant fact in establishing apparent
150
The Rodriguez Court also considered the affirmative
authority.
statements the third party made: she lived there and had furniture
151
Here, St. Jean’s username and
and clothing in the apartment.
password were the virtual equivalent to a key, giving Hillstone
access to the Spec-Tator group. However, St. Jean was not the
152
creator of the group and would not have had administrative
153
Thus, St.
privileges unless Pietrylo had assigned them to her.
Jean did not have the ability to control membership or content of
the group, edit the group’s description or settings, or remove or
154
Instead of having common authority over the
ban members.
group, she was the equivalent of a guest in a virtual room, limited
155
St. Jean’s
to the features enabled by the group’s creator.
apparent authority would not extend so far as to give a reasonably
cautious person the belief that she shared joint control over the
148. Id. at 171 n.7.
149. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
150. Id. at 179–81.
151. Id. at 179. The assertions made by the third party were ultimately proven
false and it was determined that she did not have common authority over the
apartment. Id. at 181–82.
152. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
153. See Facebook Help Center Admin Basics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com
/help/?page=18829 (last visited Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook Admin Basics]
(click on the description of “What is a group admin?”). A group member can be
given administrative privileges and gain all of these abilities by the creator or
another administrator of the group. Id. Without administrative privileges, a
member can only post comments on the group’s wall, post pictures, or do any
other activities allowed by the settings of the group. See Facebook Help Center Group
Features, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=18832 (last visited
Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook Group Features].
154. See Facebook Admin Basics, supra note 153.
155. See Facebook Group Features, supra note 153.
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group.
Further analogizing a username and password to a key in the
context of social networking websites likewise does not give
Hillstone apparent authority to enter the Spec-Tator group.
Compare a Facebook profile to a hotel. The manager of the hotel
has the master key to all of the rooms. Some of the rooms are
vacant, so the manager could enter those rooms without violating
anyone’s privacy. Other rooms are checked out, and if the
manager, or anyone else, were to use the key and enter without the
156
Here, a
occupants’ permission, it would invade their privacy.
Facebook profile is the hotel, the individual’s username and
password are the master key, and the groups of which the user is a
member are the rooms. The groups that are left open are like the
vacant rooms—a person can enter them without violating the
occupant’s privacy. The groups that are private are like the
occupied rooms—they cannot be entered without permission. Just
as possession of a key by itself does not automatically demonstrate
permission to enter a locked area, a username and password do not
automatically demonstrate permission to enter a private group on a
social networking website. Therefore, having a username and
password alone should not be sufficient to give apparent authority
to enter a private group on a social networking website.
2.

Seclusion on the Internet

Given the relatively new phenomenon of social networking
websites, no court has explicitly ruled on the threshold question of
when a website moves from the public to the private sphere, but
other decisions provide valuable insight. In United States v. GinesPerez, the district court in Puerto Rico ruled on the relationship
157
The police
between privacy and the Internet in a criminal case.
identified the suspect by using a picture that was taken from a
business website still under construction and not yet open to the
158
It ruled that “a claim to privacy is unavailable to
public at large.
someone who places information on an indisputably, public
medium, such as the Internet, without taking any measures to protect
159
the information.”
Using similar reasoning, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in
156.
157.
158.
159.

See Prosser, supra note 14, at 389–90.
United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225–26 (D.P.R. 2002).
Id. at 212–13.
Id. at 225.
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160

Yath v. Fairview Clinics ruled that information the defendant
posted on an open MySpace page was necessarily made public
under a theory of publication of private facts—a related invasion-of161
In a
privacy claim provided by section 652D of the Restatement.
concurring opinion, Judge Johnson suggested that the analysis
162
would be different if it had been a private webpage, but the
majority opinion never addressed the issue because it was not part
of the fact pattern. Dealing with a restricted website, the Ninth
Circuit in Konop found that controlling Internet access by assigning
account names and passwords was sufficient to create seclusion in a
163
claim based on statutory privacy.
The common element among the different courts and the
different contexts in which privacy is applied is whether the
plaintiffs took steps to maintain their privacy. The district court in
Gines-Perez viewed the lack of any positive steps to keep the
communications on the Internet private as a fundamental
164
shortcoming for claiming privacy, while the Ninth Circuit in
Konop found the issuance of account names and passwords to be
165
Because all social networking websites require a
sufficient.
username and password, that alone may not be adequate, but the
Yath concurrence suggests that a private webpage would be enough
166
Therefore, because Pietrylo took
to establish privacy online.
affirmative steps to keep the MySpace group private by personally
inviting each member into the group and stating that Spec-Tator
167
was a private group, he probably could satisfy all three standards
set forth by the different courts.
C. Public Policy Reasons for Extending Seclusion to Virtual Spaces
Giving private online spaces the protection of “seclusion”
would discourage Facebook “stalking” and the like. Using Solove’s
160. Yath v. Fairview Clinics, 767 N.W.2d 34, 42–43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
161. Id. at 43. Restatement section 652A provides: “(1) One who invades the
right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the
interests of the other. (2) The right to privacy is invaded by . . . (c) unreasonable
publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652D.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
162. Yath, 767 N.W.2d. at 51 (Johnson, J., concurring).
163. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
164. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225.
165. Konop, 302 F.3d at 884.
166. Yath, 767 N.W.2d at 51 (Johnson, J., concurring).
167. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
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framework of surveillance and its associated harms,
James
Grimmelmann describes “Facebook stalking” as occurring when a
person snoops into the profiles of distant acquaintances of those
169
whom are considered to be outside one’s general social network.
Similar to a Peeping Tom looking through a window at night, the
Facebook stalker looks through the virtual window of a person’s
profile or group.
The privacy paradox in which social network users disclose
large amounts of personal information, yet retain a sense of
170
privacy, asserts itself most prominently when plaintiffs assist their
171
stalkers by accepting friendship requests of distant acquaintances.
People who accept many distant acquaintances as “friends” and do
not set any privacy settings may rightfully react with indignation
that their personal information was accessed by someone outside of
172
their normally accepted social network, but they should not be
surprised because that is exactly what they gave them permission to
do. Even employers are taking advantage of social networking
pages that are left open. A survey by the Ponemon Institute
reported that “61% of professional services companies, which
includes law firms, conduct Google searches on job candidates . . . .
[and] more [than] 50% of the companies also search social
173
network websites, such as Facebook and MySpace.”
The Restatement and case law seem to indicate that when a
social network user leaves an online profile or group open,
seclusion cannot be claimed, but when people access a private
(protected) profile or group without authorization, they have
intruded upon the seclusion of those protected by the privacy
174
settings. The intruding party is not a part of that particular social
168. SOLOVE, supra note 13; see also supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
169. Grimmelmann, supra note 30, at 1167. To define the boundaries of a
social network—and the status of those members as truly a friend or more of an
acquaintance—is difficult because it is a fluid concept. Offline social networks are
interconnected and porous, making online social networks even more
interconnected and porous because MySpace and Facebook “friends” can change
so quickly and they can be accumulated in mass. Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at
1046. The average Facebook user has 130 “friends.” Statistics, supra note 27.
170. See Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1045; see also Grimmelmann, supra
note 30, at 1167–68 (quoting a social network user’s expectations of privacy).
171. Cf. Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1018–19 (“[T]he making of ‘friends’
online for the sake of mere accumulation of a large number of ‘friends’ as a status
symbol is a growing online social phenomenon in itself.”).
172. Id. at 1001–02.
173. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Emerging Employment Law Issues, SP024 ALI-ABA
1995, 2253 (2008).
174. Supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/7

28

Pabarcus: Are "Private" Spaces on Social Networking Websites Truly Private?

2011]

ARE PRIVATE SPACES TRULY PRIVATE?

425

network, and the plaintiff has taken steps to retain one’s privacy.
Although “Facebook stalking” and other unauthorized entries into
175
a profile or group are initially invisible, making detection and a
successful claim difficult, it does not mean that the plaintiff’s
seclusion does not exist. The ubiquitous use of the Internet and
social networking websites has challenged the strength of privacy
protections in the virtual realm, and the law should respond to
provide plaintiffs with a meaningful remedy.
V. HIGHLY OFFENSIVE TO A REASONABLE PERSON
Users of social networking websites should be able to establish
an intrusion into a private area when profiles or groups are made
176
The
private, but such an intrusion must be highly offensive.
highly offensive standard is a high threshold for plaintiffs to meet
177
and was designed to make bringing a claim difficult. This section
discusses whether and under what circumstances an intrusion into
a private profile or group on a social networking website would be
highly offensive by first examining the Restatement; second,
analyzing case law; and third, identifying public policy concerns.
A. Rule for What Constitutes Highly Offensive
As a threshold issue, the common law requires that an
178
There is
intrusion “be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
no liability unless the interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion is
substantial and a reasonable person would strongly object to the

175. See Grimmelmann, supra note 30, at 1168.
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
177. See id. at cmt. d (“There is . . . no liability unless the interference with the
plaintiff’s seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to
the ordinary reasonable man, as the result of conduct to which the reasonable
man would strongly object.”); see also Prosser, supra note 14, at 422–23. Prosser
expresses concern over how far intrusion upon seclusion should go, explaining
that “the question may well be raised whether there are not some limits, and
whether . . . a lady who insists upon sun-bathing in the nude in her own back yard
should really have a cause of action for her humiliation when the neighbors
examine her with appreciation and binoculars.” Id. at 422. He concludes, “This is
not to say that the developments in the law of privacy are wrong. . . . It is to say
rather that it is high time that we realize what we are doing, and give some
consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt.” Id. at
423. See also Richards & Solove, supra note 58, at 1890 (“Prosser [the primary
author of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] was deeply skeptical of the privacy
torts. . . .”).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
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179

intrusion.
Knocking on the plaintiff’s door or calling the
plaintiff, even two or three times for payment of a debt, does not
constitute a “highly offensive” intrusion because the actions do not
180
amount to a substantial burden to the plaintiff’s existence.
B. Case Law Interpreting the Definition of Highly Offensive
The Nevada Supreme Court noted that what constitutes
“highly offensive” is “largely a matter of social conventions and
181
and identified factors that contribute to
expectations,”
determining whether an intrusion was highly offensive: “the degree
of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding
the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the
setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose
182
privacy is invaded.” The California Supreme Court echoed some
of the same factors, stating that “all the circumstances of an
intrusion, including the motives or justification of the intruder, are
183
The Nevada and
pertinent to the offensiveness element.”
California Supreme Courts identify a broad-range, overlapping,
184
While this is only a very
and non-exhaustive list of factors.
selective representation of jurisdictions, it does suggest a totality-ofthe-circumstances approach to analyzing the factor of “highly
offensive.” The result is that it gives courts broad authority to
decide whether intrusion upon seclusion claims can go forward,
and injects a degree of uncertainty into the outcome of jury cases.
In Pietrylo, Hillstone management used the username and
password of a current group member to secretly and deliberately
gain access to the group to monitor and evaluate what it ultimately
185
The facts surrounding
concluded were “offensive” statements.
179. Id. at cmt. d.
180. Id. An example of when an intrusion is “highly offensive” and thereby
invades a plaintiff’s privacy is when “telephone calls are repeated with such
persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that
becomes a substantial burden to his existence.” Id.
181. PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1281 (Nev. 1995) (quoting
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.10(A)(2) (1993)).
182. Id. at 1282 (quoting Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct.
App. 1986)).
183. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998); see also
Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 73–74 (Cal. 1999) (“Privacy for purposes
of the intrusion tort must be evaluated with respect to the identity of the alleged
intruder and the nature of the intrusion.”).
184. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 493; PETA, 867 P.2d at 1133.
185. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *3–4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
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Hillstone’s intrusion using the factors from the Nevada and
California courts could be sufficient to classify Hillstone’s actions as
“highly offensive.”
The first factor of degree of intrusion and Hillstone’s conduct
would favor Pietrylo. Hillstone committed a complete intrusion
into the virtual space because upper management used the account
name and password of a member to gain full access and read all of
186
Upper
the material posted on the Spec-Tator group.
management did not accidentally stumble across the website, but
made a conscious decision to enter the website and view its
187
contents.
A second factor is the context and circumstances surrounding
the intrusion, which may also favor Pietrylo. Hillstone acted with
188
secrecy and deliberateness in accessing the Spec-Tator group, a
private virtual space not associated with and operated separately
from the restaurant’s business. The stealth of Hillstone’s actions
may contribute to the degree of offensiveness for some juries. The
users of online social networking websites are disproportionately
represented by younger generations who may be more sensitive to
189
online intrusions, as market research shows that only ten percent
of online socializers are older than fifty-five, while almost fifty
190
percent of online socializers are younger than thirty-five.
Finally, Hillstone’s motives and objectives are probably
canceled out by Pietrylo’s privacy expectations.
Hillstone’s
objective was to see what its employees were saying about the
191
The fact that Hillstone ultimately fired Pietrylo and
restaurant.

186. Id. at *3.
187. Id.
188. See id. (giving upper management the username and password to read the
unedited posts).
189. Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1001–02 (users of social networking
websites react with indignation when their profiles are accessed by those outside
their social network).
190. Id. at 1017. However, surveys from April 2008 and April 2009 indicate
that the highest growth percentage for Facebook users was the 35–49 year-old
demographic, followed by the 50–64 year-old demographic. Product Briefs, 26 No.
21 LAW. PC 12, 12–13 (2009); see also Camille Broussard, Teaching with Technology: Is
the Pedagogical Fulcrum Shifting?, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 903, 912 (2009) (referring
to the generation of young adults who are totally comfortable with emerging
technologies as “digital natives,” and those who use web-based applications and
technologies, but for whom it is not their native soil, as “digital immigrants”).
191. See Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *3–4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008) (viewing and printing content from the
Spec-Tator).
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192

Marino indicates that its objective in intruding upon the SpecTator group was to determine if any employees had committed
misconduct. This suggests that Hillstone entered knowing that it
was not invited and that the company was searching for employee
misconduct. Having intentions where punishment would be a
likely consequence seems more offensive than if a member of
upper management had discovered the website by accident and
surveyed it out of general curiosity.
However, Hillstone’s objectionable motives to control what it
deemed to be offensive behavior are balanced by Pietrylo’s
193
objective expectations of privacy. While Pietrylo maintains that
he expected everything to remain private within the Spec-Tator
group, he did invite several people to be members of an online
194
group. Information on the Internet can spread rapidly and has a
195
Unlike a conversation
high degree of permanency once posted.
in a physical room, where the spoken word has no lasting presence,
196
The
posted material on the Internet can remain indefinitely.
nature of the Internet makes an intrusion less offensive than if
Hillstone had clandestinely listened to a spoken conversation.
While Hillstone’s motives may factor in favor of Pietrylo, they seem
to be balanced out by Pietrylo’s chosen medium.
C. Public Policy Reasons for Extending the Concept of “Highly Offensive”
to Virtual Spaces
The factors to determine what is highly offensive, presented
197
above, are necessarily judgment calls for the finder of fact to
decide. While it is a subjective process, the factors appear to
advance a concept of personal dignity, and understanding the role
of personal dignity through the development of the right to privacy
provides guidance for determining what constitutes “highly
offensive.” In 1890, Warren and Brandeis reasoned:
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon
advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some
192. Id. at *4.
193. See id. at *18 (“A right to privacy may be a source of ‘a clear mandate of
public policy’ that could support a claim for wrongful termination; however, these
privacy interests will be balanced against the employer’s interests in managing the
business.”).
194. Id. at *2.
195. See Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1046.
196. See id.
197. See supra Part V.B.
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retreat from the world, and man, under the refining
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to
publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more
essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy,
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater
198
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Their reflection on society could apply equally well to social
networking websites today. Warren and Brandeis went on to argue
that developments in technology made solitude and privacy more
199
essential to the individual.
Edward Bloustein contends that Warren and Brandeis’s right
to privacy protects personal dignity, which should be the
fundamental concept courts use to decide cases of intrusion upon
200
Bloustein explains, “[O]ur Western culture defines
seclusion.
individuality as including the right to be free from certain types of
intrusions. This measure of personal isolation and personal
control over the conditions of its abandonment is of the very
201
The Shulman
essence of personal freedom and dignity . . . .”
202
court couched its intrusion analysis in Bloustein’s reasoning,
finding that an intrusion into private places, conversations, or
203
matters represents the best example of an invasion of privacy.
Moreover, sociological research suggests that even when people are
in public spaces, they need personal space for “comfort, ease, and
204
relaxation.”
In Pietrylo, Hillstone’s intrusion may meet the element of
“highly offensive” when using Bloustein’s definition of privacy
based on the loss of personal isolation and the loss of personal
control of choosing when to abandon that seclusion. Pietrylo
created a space to relax and find comfort with other coworkers and
by excluding management from the Spec-Tator group, Pietrylo
attempted to create a partially isolated place to vent about personal
205
When upper
matters, such as his feelings about his workplace.
management entered the Spec-Tator group, Hillstone intruded
198. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 12, at 196.
199. Id. at 195.
200. Bloustein, supra note 1, at 971, 973–74.
201. Id. at 973.
202. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489 (Cal. 1998).
203. Id.
204. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 164–65.
205. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *1–2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
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upon Pietrylo’s isolation by invading the area Pietrylo had created
for comfort, ease, and relaxation among his coworkers and friends.
Moreover, upper management took away Pietrylo’s personal
control of abandoning his privacy. Personal dignity is lost as soon
as an intruder penetrates the private virtual space that was created
because it destroys limited personal isolation and usurps the
personal control of choosing when and how to abandon one’s
seclusion.
A second reason personal dignity should play a role in
determining offensiveness is because it best conceptualizes the
harm associated with invasion of privacy claims involving digital
information. Currently, the competing theoretical approach to the
206
dignity paradigm is that online privacy is rooted in control. This
theory provides people, groups, and institutions with the autonomy
to decide when, how, and to what extent information is shared with
207
So long as people have control over the personal
other people.
information that is disclosed about them, there is no violation of
208
When someone intrudes on another’s autonomy by
privacy.
gaining access to private information, the latter has lost control and
209
there is an invasion of privacy.
There are three challenges to this theory. First, online social
networks are extremely complex, large, and fluid, making any
control settings difficult to maintain if used to keep out specific
210
Second, when information
people or particular types of people.
is in digital form, it can easily be copied, distributed, and
211
The control approach may not always offer
manipulated.
206. Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1001–02.
207. Id. at 1008–09 (surveying different theories of privacy as control).
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1046; see also Adrienne Felt & David Evans, Privacy Protection for
Social Networking APIs, U. OF VIRGINIA ENGINEERING DEP’T OF COMPUTER SCI.,
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/felt/privacybyproxy.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2011)
(proposing that social networks are “complex” and “fluid”). Examples of “types of
people” could include coworkers, family members, or classmates within the same
“network school.” Facebook uses schools and geographical locations to define
networks. Some privacy settings allow everyone within a network to see everyone’s
profile, regardless of whether they are “friends” or not. Other privacy settings
allow friends of friends to have access. Therefore, networks and who is part of a
network can constantly change.
211. See, e.g., Emi Kolawole, DefCon Opens Its Doors to Pre-teen and Teen Hackers,
WASH. POST INNOVATIONS (Aug. 9, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/defcon-opens-its-doors-to-pre-teenand-teen-hackers/2011/08/08/gIQALnOW3I_blog.html (reporting that the
hacking conference, DefCon, now invites young people aged eight to sixteen, as a
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adequate protection to a plaintiff, because the ease at which
information is created and distributed makes the control approach
212
Finally, the
difficult to apply and thus unenforceable.
Restatement only seeks to protect against “highly offensive”
213
behavior. Loss of control is not inherently offensive. Rather, it is
the nature of the space and the manner in which the space is
intruded upon that may be offensive.
A personal dignity approach provides a clearer line of when an
intrusion highly offends a reasonable person. When a defendant
214
that
intrudes upon a private place, conversation, or matter
215
inhibits the comfort, ease, and relaxation of the plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s personal dignity has been highly offended. Pietrylo
created a private MySpace group to vent about occurrences at work
with other restaurant employees outside the presence of
216
Hillstone intruded upon this private conversation
management.
217
Hillstone also
by using St. Jean’s account name and password.
inhibited Pietrylo’s comfort, ease, and relaxation because it
218
effectively shut down the space and then fired him from his job.
This would probably be highly offensive to a reasonable person’s
sense of personal dignity.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article began with the question of whether a private,
virtual space created by a social networking website would be
covered by the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B (1977).
Given the relatively new emergence of social networking websites,
this issue is just beginning to be addressed by courts. While courts
219
have been slow to integrate new technologies into privacy law,
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion should be extended to cover
intrusion into private areas created on social networking websites
because the language of the Restatement is sufficiently broad, it
new trend emerges of summer camps and programs dedicated to teaching kids
how to manipulate digital information).
212. See id. (describing a culture of hacking).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
214. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 489 (Cal. 1998).
215. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 164.
216. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108834, at *1–2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008).
217. Id. at *2–3.
218. See id. at *3–4 (accessing the group to view the comments).
219. Richards & Solove, supra note 58, at 1921 (“[C]ourts appear stuck with
notions of privacy more appropriate for the first half of the twentieth century.”).
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would be a natural extension of the case law, and public policy
favors such an interpretation.
Under the first factor—intentional intrusion, physical or
otherwise—an intrusion of a virtual space should be assessed based
on whether the defendant learned of the plaintiff’s private affairs
or matters through a type of surveillance. The second factor—
establishing an expectation of seclusion or solitude on social
networking websites—should be evaluated not by the number of
people who have access to the profile or group, but rather by the
privacy settings the plaintiff has implemented to restrict access to
his or her information. Finally, the third factor—determining what
is highly offensive—should be analyzed through a lens of personal
dignity that takes into account the private space, conversation, or
matter intruded upon and the result of whether the plaintiff’s
comfort, ease, and relaxation were inhibited. Such an extension of
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion will provide the proper
protection to online social network users who make the effort to
keep certain messages and material private on the Internet.
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